Goldman og Deutseche Bank dybt uenige om effekt af Trumps told: DB ser det som en bombe

Uddrag fra Goldman/ Deutsche Bank og Zerohedge (dansk bearbejdet tekst nedenfor):

What happens next? Here Wall Street disagrees sharply.

In one corner, we have Goldman which believes that the trade war won’t have much of an impact on either US inflation or GDP, since it will be sufficiently short-lived to not have a long-term impact on the economy.

In his tariff post-mortem, Goldman’s chief economist Jan Hatzius gives a somewhat cheerful view and writes that while the outlook is unclear, “the Canada- and Mexico-focused tariffs are likely to be short-lived.” Hatzius also notes that in light of “their potential economic effects and the fact that the White House has set general conditions for their removal, it is more likely that the tariffs will be temporary but the outlook is unclear.”

The Goldman economist then notes that while he previously had estimated that a sustained 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico would increase the effective US tariff rate by 7%, implying a 0.7% increase in US core PCE prices and a 0.4% hit to GDP (the 10% tariff on energy products reduces the impact slightly). The economic forecast already assumes a roughly 20% tariff on imports from China, boosting core prices by around 0.3%. Hatzius plans to update these estimates and his forecast in the light of the new tariff details (full note available to pro subs)

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In the other corner, we have a far more dire and downbeat take from Deutsche Bank chief FX strategist George Saravelos (he of EURUSD below parity fame) who published a Sunday piece titled “A Huge Shock” (also available to pro subs) in which he says that if Trump’s tariffs go ahead, he sees them “as constituting the largest shock in global trade policy since the collapse of Breton Woods. We see immediate recessionary consequences for some of the economies involved and broad-based negative read-across to the world economy.”

Below we excerpt from the Saravelos note:

First, we consider the announcements to be at the most hawkish end of the protectionist spectrum we could have envisaged. The speed of implementation (Tuesday 12:01am EST), the scope (all goods are covered, including small parcel goods previously exempted) and the breadth (approximately 44% of total US imports) are all aggressive. It is especially notable that energy imports from Canada are in scope. Even if at a reduced rate of 10%, that the administration is willing to impose tariffs on energy pushes back against the market narrative that cost-of-living considerations would act as a restraint. The macroeconomic implications of such tariffs are likely to be wide-ranging and materially disruptive, especially outside of the US.

Second, the market needs to structurally and significantly reprice the trade war risk premium. We have been writing for a while that the market was underpricing these risks. We have also been warning about the negative read-across tariffs on Canada – America’s closest ally – would imply for the rest of the world. By our estimates, the market was roughly pricing the equivalent of a 5% universal tariff being enacted in coming months, equivalent to a 30bps “hump” in the US inflation curve. The announcements this weekend are roughly three times larger with reasonable passthrough assumptions, i.e., we would expect a 1% US headline inflation impact if tariffs are sustained. These tariffs are also roughly five times as large as the cumulative sum of trade actions taken under the first Trump administration measured in terms of average tariff increases. For Canada and Mexico, we see this trade shock – if sustained – as being far larger in economic magnitude than that of Brexit on the UK and would expect both countries to enter a recession in coming weeks.

Third, and by extension of the above, we would expect a large and volatile market reaction on the open this Sunday evening. We would be focused on three near-term drivers.

1. The magnitude of the market reaction itself and the extent to which the Trump administration proves responsive to it. Note that the President sounded dismissive of the market reaction in comments to the press corp on Friday night, as well as a social media post this morning, yet the market has been assuming an embedded “Trump put” in the S&P. As per our scenario analysis, we expect USD/CAD to trade potentially to as high as 1.50 after the market open (a +3% move) with larger moves in USD/MXN given the inadequate risk premium priced in. In China, the onshore market is closed due to the Lunar New Year holidays until Wednesday 5th of February complicating things. The absence of an anchor from the daily USDCNY fix and/or liquidity operations will create additional pressure on the authorities and may encourage the markets to test all-time highs on USDCNH at 7.36. The market will be closely watching official-sector behaviour. A EUR/USD move closer to parity would fully capture the risk premium around these tariffs according to our framework, without any euro-specific tariffs on top. Beyond FX, a tariff war should be interpreted as a combination of fiscal tightening (a consumption tax) and a negative supply shock. It is therefore clearly negative for equity markets. The fixed income response is more complicated given opposing inflationary/growth drivers. It is crucially dependent on the market’s assumption on offsetting fiscal easing. Tariffs, though, should clearly lead to widening interest rate differentials between the US and the rest of the world given the negative hit on the latter is going to be bigger: for context, trade of impacted goods as a share of GDP is 45% in Mexico, 33% in Canada and only 9% in the US.
2. Attempts to block President Trump’s tariffs in US courts. Given the highly expansive use of presidential authority under the IEEPA, impacted parties are highly likely to seek an immediate temporary injunction, similar to the restraining order on federal spending last week. The use of National Emergency powers has not been tested in this way before, so it is highly uncertain what the court reaction might be. The next few days will be a major test of presidential power and potentially cause additional market volatility. Still, even if an injunction is granted, President Trump also holds authority to impose tariffs over multiple other executive avenues, as per our analysis of the trade memo that was released on the first day of the Administration.
3. The response from affected countries and “tit-for-tat” escalation. Canada has already announced reciprocal tariffs of 25% on $155bn of US goods with a staggered implementation period and with the country having the greatest scope to retaliate given more balanced trade with the US. During the announcement, PM Trudeau confirmed that President Trump has not met with him since inauguration day, implying that there are no high-level communications. With the US Executive Order already embedding a cross-retaliation provision, there is an immediate question mark on whether this is activated. Both China and Mexico have also threatened retaliation but with no firm announcements yet. This leaves some space for de-escalation, but with a negative time decay: the longer time goes by without signs of constructive engagement and retaliation from the other countries, the longer these tariffs are likely to be assumed to be permanent – and by extension the more negative the market reaction.

To conclude, given the magnitude of the economic impact involved, we hesitate to assume that the announced tariffs will be permanent. On the flipside, we have long been arguing that the market has been severely under-estimating revenue-raising considerations, and this will incentivize the administration to have tariffs in place ahead of the US budget negotiations in coming months. We expect the market reaction to at least in part shape the US reaction function, and this will be a reflexive learning process both for markets and the Administration in coming days. Irrespectively, the most long-lasting impact is likely to be a structurally more elevated tariff risk premium in coming months impacting all of America’s trading partners.

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Hvad sker der nu? Her er Wall Street skarpt uenig.

I det ene hjørne har vi Goldman, som mener, at handelskrigen ikke vil have en væsentlig effekt på hverken den amerikanske inflation eller BNP, da den vil være tilstrækkeligt kortvarig til ikke at have en langsigtet påvirkning på økonomien.

I sin analyse efter toldudmeldingen giver Goldmans cheføkonom Jan Hatzius en nogenlunde optimistisk vurdering og skriver, at selvom udsigterne er uklare, “er toldsatserne rettet mod Canada og Mexico sandsynligvis kortvarige.” Hatzius bemærker også, at i lyset af “deres potentielle økonomiske effekter og det faktum, at Det Hvide Hus har fastsat generelle betingelser for deres fjernelse, er det mere sandsynligt, at toldsatserne vil være midlertidige, men udsigterne er uklare.”

Goldman-økonomen bemærker derefter, at han tidligere havde estimeret, at en vedvarende 25 % told på import fra Canada og Mexico ville øge den effektive amerikanske toldsats med 7 %, hvilket indebærer en stigning på 0,7 % i den amerikanske kerne-PCE-inflation og et 0,4 % fald i BNP (tolden på 10 % på energiprodukter reducerer effekten en smule). Den økonomiske prognose antager allerede en cirka 20 % told på import fra Kina, hvilket hæver kerneinflationen med omkring 0,3 %. Hatzius planlægger at opdatere disse estimater og sin prognose i lyset af de nye tolddetaljer (fuld analyse tilgængelig for professionelle abonnenter).

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I det andet hjørne har vi en langt mere dyster og pessimistisk vurdering fra Deutsche Banks chefstrateg for valutamarkedet, George Saravelos (kendt for sin forudsigelse om EUR/USD under paritet), der offentliggjorde en analyse søndag med titlen “Et kæmpe chok” (også tilgængelig for professionelle abonnenter). Her skriver han, at hvis Trumps toldsatser gennemføres, ser han dem “som det største chok i den globale handelspolitik siden sammenbruddet af Bretton Woods. Vi ser umiddelbare recessionære konsekvenser for nogle af de involverede økonomier og bredt negative effekter på verdensøkonomien.”

Nedenfor bringer vi uddrag fra Saravelos’ analyse:

For det første anser vi disse udmeldinger for at være i den mest ekstreme ende af det protektionistiske spektrum, vi kunne have forestillet os. Implementeringshastigheden (tirsdag kl. 12:01 EST), omfanget (alle varer er dækket, inklusive tidligere undtagne småpakker) og bredden (cirka 44 % af den samlede amerikanske import) er alle aggressive. Det er særligt bemærkelsesværdigt, at energiimport fra Canada er omfattet. Selv med en reduceret sats på 10 % viser det, at administrationen er villig til at pålægge told på energi, hvilket går imod markedets forventning om, at hensynet til leveomkostninger ville virke begrænsende. De makroøkonomiske konsekvenser af sådanne toldsatser vil sandsynligvis være vidtrækkende og betydeligt forstyrrende, især uden for USA.

For det andet må markedet strukturelt og markant genvurdere risikoen ved en handelskrig. Vi har længe skrevet, at markedet undervurderede disse risici. Vi har også advaret om, at de negative konsekvenser af toldsatser på Canada – Amerikas nærmeste allierede – ville have implikationer for resten af verden. Ifølge vores estimater prissatte markedet omtrent en universel told på 5 % inden for de kommende måneder, hvilket svarer til en 30 basispoints stigning i den amerikanske inflationskurve. Weekendens udmeldinger er omtrent tre gange større, hvilket med rimelige antagelser om overførselseffekter betyder, at vi ville forvente en stigning på 1 % i den amerikanske forbrugerprisindeks (CPI), hvis tolden fastholdes. Disse toldsatser er også omtrent fem gange større end summen af de handelsforanstaltninger, der blev gennemført under Trumps første embedsperiode, målt i gennemsnitlige toldforhøjelser. For Canada og Mexico vurderer vi, at dette handelschok – hvis det opretholdes – vil være langt større i økonomisk omfang end Brexit var for Storbritannien, og vi forventer, at begge lande går i recession i de kommende uger.

For det tredje forventer vi som følge heraf en stor og volatil markedsreaktion ved åbningen søndag aften. Vi vil fokusere på tre kortsigtede drivere:

1. Omfanget af markedsreaktionen i sig selv og i hvilken grad Trump-administrationen reagerer på den. Præsidenten lød afvisende over for markedsreaktionen i kommentarer til pressen fredag aften samt i et opslag på sociale medier søndag morgen, men markedet har hidtil antaget en implicit “Trump-put” i S&P 500. Ifølge vores scenarieanalyse forventer vi, at USD/CAD potentielt kan handle så højt som 1,50 efter markedsåbningen (en bevægelse på +3 %) med endnu større bevægelser i USD/MXN, da risikopræmien her ikke er korrekt prissat. I Kina er det hjemlige marked lukket på grund af Lunar New Year-ferierne frem til onsdag den 5. februar, hvilket komplicerer situationen. Fraværet af en fast reference fra den daglige USDCNY-fastsættelse og/eller likviditetsoperationer vil lægge ekstra pres på myndighederne og kan få markedet til at teste rekordhøjder på USDCNH ved 7,36. Markedet vil nøje overvåge de officielle reaktioner. En bevægelse i EUR/USD tættere på paritet ville fuldt ud indfange risikopræmien for disse toldsatser ifølge vores model – uden yderligere euro-specifikke toldforanstaltninger.
2. Forsøg på at blokere Trumps toldsatser i amerikanske domstole. På grund af den meget ekspansive anvendelse af præsidentiel myndighed under IEEPA forventer vi, at berørte parter hurtigt vil søge en midlertidig forføjningskendelse, som det skete med føderale udgifter i sidste uge. Brugen af nationale nødretsbeføjelser er ikke blevet testet på denne måde før, så reaktionen fra domstolene er meget usikker. De kommende dage vil være en stor prøve for præsidentens magtbeføjelser og kan føre til yderligere markedsvolatilitet. Selv hvis en forføjning gives, har Trump stadig autoritet til at pålægge told via flere andre eksekutive kanaler.
3. Reaktionen fra de berørte lande og potentiel “tit-for-tat” eskalering. Canada har allerede annonceret en modsvarstold på 25 % på 155 mia. dollars af amerikanske varer med en gradvis implementering. Landet har den største mulighed for gengældelse, da handelsbalancen med USA er mere jævnbyrdig. Under annonceringen bekræftede premierminister Trudeau, at Trump ikke har mødtes med ham siden indsættelsesdagen, hvilket antyder, at der ikke er nogen højprofileret dialog. Både Kina og Mexico har truet med gengældelse, men har endnu ikke fremlagt konkrete planer.

Afslutningsvis, givet den enorme økonomiske påvirkning, tøver vi med at antage, at de annoncerede toldsatser bliver permanente. På den anden side har vi længe argumenteret for, at markedet har undervurderet regeringens incitamenter til at bruge toldsatser som en indtægtskilde, hvilket kan øge sandsynligheden for, at de forbliver gældende op til de kommende amerikanske budgetforhandlinger.