Regnskabskvalitet: En gang fupmager altid fupmager

I et forskningspapir med titlen “Problem Directors on the Audit Committee and Financial Reporting Quality” påvises det, at der oftere er regnskabsmanipulation i selskaber, hvor eet medlem af revisionskomiteen tidligere har været involveret I regnskabssminke, end i selskaber uden erhvervsfolk med den type: ”The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences for financial reporting quality of audit committees that include problem directors, i.e. directors with prior involvement in corporate bankruptcies, major accounting restatements or other accounting scandals. An ordinary least squares regression model is used to investigate the impact of audit committee problem directors on both discretionary accruals and real earnings management. Results reveal that real earnings management is significantly higher for firms having problem directors on the audit committee, suggesting less vigilant monitoring of managerial opportunistic reporting behavior by such committees. Regression results also provide some evidence of negative market valuation for firms having problem directors on their audit committee.