Ifølge tabel side 28 i rapporten er der i den schweisiske bank fundet 194 danske klientkonti, på grundlag af de lækkede bankoplysninger,
Ifølge samme tabel var indestående på hver konto i gennemsnit 1,7 mio. USD, altså ca. 12 mio. kr. knap en tredjedel af det gennemsnitlige indestående af nordmændendes, men lidt mere end svenskernes.
Samlet var danskernes samlede indestående 324 mio. USD i HSBC.
Men hvordan kommer forskerne så frem til, at rige danskere har samlet 60 mia. kr. i skattely.
På baggrund af den samlede off shore formue i Schweiz på 2.500 mia USD skønnes det, at danskernes andel er 4,3 mia USD i Schweiz.
Og på baggrund af den samlede globale off shore formue på 6.335 mia. USD skønnes det, at danskernes andel er 8,3 mia. USD, altså ca. 60 mia. kr.
Udgangspunktet for beregningen af den danske skattely formue er altså først og fremmest 194 danskere med en gennemsnits formue i Schweiz på 1,7 mio.USD.
Panama Papers indgår som den anden vigtige del af regnestykket. Men som det fremgår nedenfor er lige netop Danmark taget ud af denne del af beregningen, måske fordi der ikke blev afsløret en eneste rigtig velhaver med millionkonti i Mossack Foseca.
Abstract
This paper attempts to estimate (fremhævet af Red) the size and distribution of tax evasion in rich countries. We combine stratified random audits—the key source used to study tax evasion so far—with new micro-data leaked from two large offshore financial institutions, HSBC Switzerland (“Swiss leaks”) and Mossack Fonseca (“Panama Papers”). We match these data to population-wide wealth (fremhævet af Red) records in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. We find that tax evasion rises sharply with wealth, a phenomenon that random audits fail to capture. On average about 3% of personal taxes are evaded in Scandinavia, but this figure rises to about 30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution, a group that includes households with more than $40 million in net wealth. A simple model of the supply of tax evasion services can explain why evasion rises steeply with wealth. Taking tax evasion into account increases the rise in inequality seen in tax data since the 1970s markedly, highlighting the need to move beyond tax data to capture income and wealth at the top, even in countries where tax compliance is generally high. We also find that after reducing tax evasion—by using tax amnesties—tax evaders do not legally avoid taxes more. This result suggests that fighting tax evasion can be an effective way to collect more tax revenue from the ultra-wealthy.
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Det oplyses at data fra Panama Papers holdes op mod data fra HSBC, bare ikke for Danmark:
“A body of additional evidence suggests that the probability to use offshore financial institutions— beyond HSBC Switzerland—in order to conceal assets rises sharply with wealth. First is another leak—the Panama Papers. In the Spring of 2016, the ICIJ published the names and addresses of the owners of shell companies created by the Panamanian firm Mossack Fonseca. The leak occurred in 2015—eight years after the HSBC leak. It provides information on shell corporation that were still active in 2015 despite the increased scrutiny of offshore evasion after the financial crisis. We matched the names of the shareholders of these shell companies to individual wealth data in Norway and Sweden (but not Denmark). (fremhævet af Red) Although Mossack Fonseca—like HSBC Switzerland—is a major provider of offshore services, the sample of matched households is smaller than for the HSBC leak (165 vs. 520). Beyond the exclusion of Denmark, one other factor contributes to the smaller sample size: a large number of shell companies cannot be linked to their ultimate owner.
A company created by Mossack Fonseca can be owned by another shell created by another incorporation agent, in which case ultimate owners remain untraceable—while they are usually identifiable at HSBC. A last limitation of the Panama Papers is that we don’t know whether Scandinavians named in the leak evaded taxes. There are legal uses of shell companies, and the investigations conducted by the tax authorities are still ongoing.
Despite these limitations, the Panama Papers provide valuable information. They confirm that the use of tax havens steeply rises with wealth. (fremhævet af Red) The distribution is even more skewed than in the HSBC leak. As shown in the top panel of Figure 4, the probability to own a Mossack Fonseca offshore shell company reaches 1.2% in the top 0.01% of the (Norwegian plus Swedish) wealth distribution, against less than 0.2% for all groups below the top 0.01%. The difference between the top 0.01% and all other groups is highly statistically significant (Table 2, col. 5). As shown by Appendix Figure S.10, the picture is similar when one looks at Norway and Sweden separately.
