Referat af analyse fra JP Morgan

Politiske tiltag mod stigende oliepriser og betydningen af Hormuz-strædet

Oliepriserne faldt mandag til under 90 dollar pr. tønde efter en koordineret politisk indsats for at dæmpe energimarkederne. G7-landene meddelte, at de overvejer en fælles frigivelse af olie fra strategiske beredskabslagre (Strategic Petroleum Reserves, SPR). USA har foreslået en samlet frigivelse på op til 400 millioner tønder, men der er endnu ikke indgået en endelig aftale.

Tirsdag øgede Det Internationale Energiagentur (IEA) presset ved at indkalde til et ekstraordinært møde om en mulig frigivelse af strategiske reserver. Meldingen bidrog til yderligere fald i oliepriserne for anden dag i træk.

Priserne blev også presset ned efter en Reuters-rapport om, at præsident Donald Trump overvejer en række politiske tiltag for at dæmpe energipriserne. Blandt mulighederne er begrænsning af amerikansk olieeksport, regulering af futuresmarkederne, midlertidig ophævelse af visse føderale brændstofafgifter samt suspension af den såkaldte Jones Act, som kræver, at brændstoftransport mellem amerikanske havne sker på amerikanskbyggede og -flagede skibe. Oliepriserne faldt yderligere efter Trumps udtalelse til CBS om, at krigen kan være tæt på afslutning.

Ifølge JPMorgans råvarechef Natasha Kaneva vil sådanne politiske tiltag dog kun have begrænset effekt på oliepriserne, hvis ikke sikker passage gennem Hormuz-strædet sikres. Hvis trafikken gennem strædet forbliver usikker, kan verdensmarkedet potentielt miste op til 12 millioner tønder olie om dagen inden for de næste to uger.

Seks politiske muligheder for at dæmpe oliepriserne

1. Frigivelse af olie fra strategiske reserver (SPR)

G7-landene overvejer en koordineret frigivelse på 300–400 millioner tønder olie under ledelse af IEA. JPMorgan vurderer, at en samlet frigivelse på cirka 1,2 millioner tønder om dagen er realistisk.

OECD-landenes samlede strategiske lagre udgør omkring 1.247 millioner tønder, heraf 935 millioner tønder råolie og 312 millioner tønder raffinerede produkter. USA forventes at bidrage med den største andel, suppleret af Japan, Sydkorea og europæiske lagre.

Den amerikanske SPR rummer aktuelt omkring 415 millioner tønder (58 % af kapaciteten), men moderniseringsarbejde og tekniske begrænsninger reducerer fleksibiliteten. Derudover er der juridiske og praktiske begrænsninger for, hvor langt lagrene kan nedbringes. Kongressen kræver normalt mindst 252,4 millioner tønder i reserve, selv om præsidenten kan gå under dette niveau i en alvorlig forsyningskrise.

Desuden findes et praktisk minimumsniveau på omkring 150–160 millioner tønder for at bevare lagrenes stabilitet. Der er også logistiske forsinkelser: Efter en præsidentiel beslutning går der cirka 13 dage, før leverancer kan begynde.

Selv en samlet frigivelse på 1,2 millioner tønder dagligt vil derfor kun give begrænset effekt, hvis verdensmarkedet står over for et muligt tab på op til 12 millioner tønder dagligt.

2. Begrænsning af amerikansk olieeksport

På kort sigt kan en begrænsning af USA’s eksport af olie og raffinerede produkter sænke de indenlandske priser, fordi udbuddet bliver fanget på hjemmemarkedet. På længere sigt kan det dog reducere produktionen og stramme de globale markeder, hvilket vil øge priserne internationalt og i sidste ende også i USA.

Præsidenten har juridisk mulighed for at begrænse eksporten under en national krise gennem International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) eller andre energilove.

Siden ophævelsen af det amerikanske eksportforbud i 2015 er USA blevet en af verdens største eksportører med omkring 4 millioner tønder råolie dagligt samt store mængder raffinerede produkter. Hvis disse eksportstrømme stoppes, vil internationale raffinaderier hurtigt opleve mangel, hvilket vil presse globale priser op.

3. Midlertidig ophævelse af Jones Act

Den såkaldte Jones Act kræver, at transport mellem amerikanske havne sker på skibe, der er bygget, ejet og bemandet af amerikanere. Regeringen kan dog midlertidigt suspendere loven i nødsituationer.

En sådan suspension er tidligere blevet brugt efter naturkatastrofer for at gøre det muligt for udenlandske tankskibe at transportere brændstof mellem amerikanske havne.

Hvis en frigivelse fra SPR kombineres med en midlertidig ophævelse af Jones Act, kan det gøre distributionen af olie mere effektiv, fordi transportkapaciteten ellers kan være en begrænsning.

4. Midlertidig suspension af brændstofafgifter

Den amerikanske føderale regering kan suspendere eller reducere brændstofafgifter, men det kræver normalt lovgivning vedtaget af Kongressen.

De føderale afgifter er i dag 18,4 cent pr. gallon for benzin og 24,4 cent pr. gallon for diesel og finansierer blandt andet den amerikanske Highway Trust Fund.

Delstaterne har større fleksibilitet og kan midlertidigt sænke deres egne brændstofafgifter, hvilket flere gjorde under energikrisen i 2022. Sådanne tiltag kan give kortsigtet lettelse for forbrugerne, men reducerer samtidig finansieringen af infrastruktur.

5. Lempelse af regler for E15-benzin

Den amerikanske miljøstyrelse (EPA) kan midlertidigt tillade salg af benzin med 15 % ethanol (E15) i sommerperioden, hvor det normalt er begrænset af hensyn til luftkvaliteten.

En sådan undtagelse kan øge det samlede benzinudbud en smule og dermed bidrage til lavere priser, men effekten vurderes at være begrænset.

6. Midlertidig lempelse af krav til benzins damptryk (RVP)

En undtagelse fra kravene til Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) kan have en lidt større effekt end E15-reglen. Den vil tillade raffinaderier at sælge vinterbenzin længere ind i sommerperioden.

Det kan øge brændstofudbuddet relativt hurtigt, fordi raffinaderier kan bruge eksisterende lagre og enklere blandingsprocesser. Effekten vil dog typisk kun være en mindre prisreduktion på nogle få cent pr. gallon.

Den afgørende faktor: Hormuz-strædet

På trods af disse politiske værktøjer vurderes deres samlede effekt at være begrænset, hvis ikke skibsfarten gennem Hormuz-strædet kan genoptages sikkert.

Den amerikanske maritime administration (MARAD) har ophævet sin tidligere anbefaling om at undgå området, men der er endnu ikke annonceret en militær operation, der kan garantere sikker passage. Der er heller ikke tegn på mineoprydning eller etablering af konvojsystemer.

For at sikre skibstrafikken vil det kræve en betydelig militær indsats med krigsskibe og tæt koordinering med allierede. USA har allerede flere hangarskibe i regionen, herunder USS Abraham Lincoln i Det Arabiske Hav og USS Gerald R. Ford i Det Røde Hav. Et tredje hangarskib, USS George H. W. Bush, kan nå regionen inden for 10–12 dage. Frankrig deltager også i operationerne, og hangarskibet Charles de Gaulle er ankommet til Cypern.

Den amerikanske strategi fokuserer i øjeblikket på at svække Irans evne til at forstyrre skibstrafikken gennem blandt andet anti-skibsmissiler, miner, droner og hurtigbåde. Samtidig forsøger man at ødelægge produktionsfaciliteter for disse våben.

Først når disse trusler er reduceret, og der etableres militære eskorter samt statsgaranterede forsikringer til tankskibe, forventes det, at kommercielle olietransporter igen vil passere Hormuz-strædet i større omfang.

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Fra JP Morgan:

Oil prices plunged below $90 on Monday following a concerted push to calm energy markets. G7 countries said they were considering a coordinated release from emergency stockpiles, with the US floating a joint release of up to 400 million barrels, although the group later indicated that an agreement was not yet in place.On Tuesday, the IEA joined the jawboning and announced an emergency meeting to discuss SPR release. The news sent oil prices to session lows for the second day in a row.

Prices also eased further after Reuters reported that President Trump was reviewing various options to tame oil prices, including restricting US exports, taking measures related to oil futures markets, waiving certain federal taxes, and suspending Jones Act requirements, which mandate that domestic fuel shipments move on US flagged vessels. Prices extended losses after Trump told CBS that the United States is “very far ahead of the 4–5 week time frame” and that “the war could be over soon.”

That said, as JPMorgan’s head of commodity research, Natasha Kaneva writes in a note this morning (available to pro subs), policy measures will have at best limited impact on oil prices unless safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz is assured, given the potential losses of up to 12 mbd over the next two weeks.

Below we excerpt from the note, and review the six options to contain rising oil prices and their pros and cons.

1. Release oil from SPR. G7 governments are discussing a coordinated SPR release of 300–400 million barrels under the IEA’s coordination. JPM estimates a combined release rate of about 1.2 mbd across participating countries is feasible, but it would not offset potential losses.

Total OECD SPR stocks are 1,247 mb, including 935 mb of crude and 312 mb of products

The United States would likely supply the largest share of any release, with additional barrels from Japan, South Korea, and European strategic stocks

With the US SPR at around 415 mb — 58% of capacity — and site modernization work ongoing, operational flexibility is likely to be lower than before the 2022 drawdown. Realistic US SPR releases today are likely below the 1.0 mbd pace averaged in 2022 because inventories are lower and salt‑cavern integrity and deliverability constraints cap withdrawal rates. There are also limits on how far inventories can be reduced. Congress mandates a minimum SPR level of 252.4 million barrels, which it can adjust, as it did in the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Bill. The President has the authority to draw the SPR below that threshold by declaring a “severe energy supply interruption,” as President Biden did in the spring of 2022 to trigger the 180 million‑barrel sale.

Even so, the SPR has a practical operational floor near 150–160 mb that must remain in place to preserve cavern stability and maintain operational flexibility, including a small portion of “roof oil” that cannot be withdrawn. There are also execution lags. Once a presidential order is issued, DOE can award contracts and begin deliveries in about 13 days, and additional shipping time is needed before volumes reach end consumers

JPM estimates that a coordinated G7 SPR release rate of about 1.2 mbd across participating countries is feasible. Historically, OECD emergency releases have peaked around 1.4 mbd, calculated as the sum of different countries’ monthly peaks achieved in different months.

While helpful, that pace would not materially ease a 16 mbd shortfall and would likely provide only initial relief while pre‑escalation cargoes are still arriving. Once those shipments clear and new loadings fail to depart, a 1.2 mbd release would be insufficient to counter potential losses of roughly 12 mbd within two weeks.

2. Export restrictions. In the short term, restricting US exports of crude and refined products would likely push domestic oil prices lower by trapping supply in the US, but over the longer term it would discourage production and tighten global markets, ultimately putting upward pressure on both global and US fuel prices.

President Trump has the authority to restrict exports of crude oil and refined products during a national emergency. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) is likely the most straightforward vehicle. Additional authority exists under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which historically allowed the executive branch to limit crude exports to protect domestic supply before the export ban was lifted in 2015. Through export control regulations administered by the Department of Commerce under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, the administration could also require licenses or impose targeted limits on energy shipments.

Since the 2015 repeal of the crude export ban, the US has become one of the world’s largest suppliers, exporting about 4 mbd of crude and significant volumes of diesel, gasoline, and other refined products to Europe, Latin America, and Asia. Curtailing these exports would initially depress domestic crude prices by trapping barrels inside the US, but the larger effect would be a sharp reduction in supply available to global markets. Refiners abroad would face immediate shortages, pushing up international benchmark prices and fuel costs. Over time, lower realized prices for US producers would likely discourage drilling and reduce output, further tightening global balances and amplifying upward pressure on oil and products worldwide.

3. Lifting Jones Act. The US government can temporarily waive the Jones Act, but it cannot permanently lift it without Congress.

The law requires that goods transported between US ports be carried on ships that are US-built, US-flagged, and US-crewed. However, under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 framework, the administration can grant temporary waivers if it determines they are necessary for national defense or in response to emergencies, typically through coordination between the US Department of Homeland Security and the US Department of Defense.

Such waivers have been issued several times, for example after major hurricanes to allow foreign tankers to move fuel between US ports.

Combining a release from the SPR with a temporary waiver of the Jones Act would make the policy more effective. Without a waiver, limited US-flagged tanker capacity could constrain how fast SPR barrels reach key refining centers or deficit regions.

4. Waiving federal taxes on gasoline and diesel. Federal action typically requires Congress, while states have more flexibility.

The US federal government can suspend or waive federal fuel taxes, but doing so generally requires congressional action. These taxes are set by statute in the Internal Revenue Code, so a full suspension typically must be passed by Congress and signed by the President. The federal rates—18.4 cents per gallon for gasoline and 24.4 cents per gallon for diesel—fund the Highway Trust Fund, which supports federal highway and infrastructure projects.

In limited circumstances, the executive branch can provide temporary administrative relief. For example, the Treasury and IRS can adjust enforcement, extend deadlines, or defer payments in emergencies such as natural disasters. However, a nationwide, long‑term waiver of the federal gasoline or diesel tax would almost certainly require new legislation from Congress.

At the state level, governments have much greater flexibility to suspend or reduce fuel taxes. Several states used this approach during the 2022 fuel price spike, temporarily suspending state fuel taxes to lower pump prices. Because state fuel taxes typically range from about 15 to more than 50 cents per gallon, a suspension could provide short-term relief for consumers, although it would also reduce revenue used to fund transportation infrastructure and road maintenance.

5. Relaxing E15 gasoline blending rule. Limited overall impact.

The U.S. government could ease fuel supply constraints by temporarily relaxing the E15 gasoline blending rule, which normally limits the sale of gasoline containing 15% ethanol during the summer months due to air-quality regulations. The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority under the Clean Air Act to grant emergency waivers allowing nationwide sales of E15 during the summer driving season.

Such waivers effectively increase the available gasoline pool by allowing higher ethanol blending, which can modestly expand supply and help ease pressure on pump prices during periods of tight fuel markets.
6. Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) waiver. A somewhat larger impact than E15, but still modest.

An RVP waiver can have a somewhat larger impact than the E15 rule because it allows refiners to sell winter-grade gasoline longer into the summer season, effectively expanding the available fuel pool. The US EPA can grant such a waiver under the Clean Air Act by temporarily relaxing limits on RVP, which normally require more expensive low-volatility gasoline during the summer months. By allowing higher RVP gasoline to be sold, refiners can increase supply quickly using existing inventories and simpler blending processes.

The impact is still moderate—typically helping ease regional shortages and lowering prices by a few cents per gallon—but it can provide faster relief than other regulatory changes because it directly increases the volume of gasoline that can be legally sold.

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The bottom line is that all the listed policy measures will have limited impact on oil prices unless safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz is assured.

Over the weekend, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) canceled its previous advisory that urged commercial vessels to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf until March 13. That step is necessary for shipowners to resume transit, but it is not sufficient on its own. There is still no announcement from the US Navy or US Central Command (CENTCOM) that the Strait is open for safe passage, and there is no evidence of mine-clearing or other convoy planning. On Sunday, Secretary Wright declined to provide a precise timeline for a restart and acknowledged that military escorts have not yet begun.

Escorting every tanker would require numerous warships and close coordination with allies, but the US Navy has limited vessels available because some are committed to ongoing operations in the region. The USS Abraham Lincoln remains in the Arabian Sea for strikes against Iran, while the USS Gerald R. Ford is moving through the Red Sea. The US is expected to deploy a third aircraft carrier to the Middle East to support the ongoing operations. The USS George H. W. Bush, along with its escorting warships and air wing, completed pre‑deployment training last Thursday and could reach the broader Middle East in roughly 10-12 days if ordered to deploy immediately. French naval forces will also participate in a defensive mission to reopen the strait, and the Marine Nationale’s Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier arrived in Cyprus on Monday. President Macron said that a ship-escort mission in the Hormuz will be feasible once the most intense phase of the war has passed, i.e. once the war is over..

At present, the broader US strategy appears focused on degrading Iran’s asymmetric capabilities that threaten commercial shipping. These include coastal anti-ship missile batteries deployed along the Iranian shoreline and on nearby islands, which enable Iranian forces to track and strike tankers passing through narrow shipping lanes. Equally important is reducing the IRGC Navy’s ability to lay naval mines, launch drone attacks, and conduct swarm assaults with speed boats. A further objective is to destroy the factories that produce missiles, drones, and naval mines, limiting Iran’s ability to replenish these systems. Once these disruption capabilities are sufficiently suppressed, US naval escorts and government‑backed insurance guarantees could restore enough confidence for commercial tankers to resume transit through the Strait of Hormuz.