Fra Analyse udarbejdet af den internationale kapitalfond Blackrock:
BREXIT TIMELINE A leave vote would immediately usher in a period of acute political and economic uncertainty for the UK – and to a lesser extent for the rest of the EU. No country has ever left the EU. This means the formal rules can provide only a rough guide for how events would unfold. The Treaty on European Union stipulates in Article 50 that a member state must notify the European Commission (EC) of its intention to leave.
This would trigger a negotiation between the rest of the EU and the UK on the arrangements for withdrawal. A majority of EU member states and the European Parliament would have to agree on the details. Separation would likely take effect either on the date a new agreement enters into force, or, failing that, two years after the initial notification.
Only unanimous agreement of the UK and the EC could extend this deadline. The earliest UK exit: June 2018. See the graphic above. In practice, we see talks dragging on for several years. The UK could delay triggering Article 50 because it arguably would reduce its bargaining power by placing a deadline on negotiations.
Any political instability in the UK following a leave vote would slow down negotiations. And the talks’ complexity could have both sides call for an extension. We see a risk of economically damaging brinkmanship in the process. A recent simulation exercise by Open Europe found UK-EU relations would break down quickly after a Brexit vote.
Potential reasons: domestic political jockeying in the UK and other EU member states, fears in the rest of the EU about setting secessionist precedents, and mercantilist desires to redirect investment in key sectors away from the UK. Also, negotiations are unlikely to take place in a collaborative spirit if the UK delegation were led by politicians hostile to the EU. It takes two to tango.
What would the UK’s relations with the EU look like in a post-Brexit world?
We see four key options:
Norwegian deal (non-starter): this would involve full access to the European Economic Area (EEA) as enjoyed by Norway and others under the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In return, EFTA members contribute to the EU budget and are bound by its ‘Four Freedoms,’ including free movement of people and regulations on working hours, banking and climate change. We cannot see a post-Brexit UK accepting these terms. Plus, EU members would likely veto the UK candidacy to avoid setting a secessionist precedent.
Swiss style (unacceptable): Switzerland has bilateral accords that grant it access to parts of the single market but exclude financial services. We see this an unacceptable option for both the UK and EU because of the financial services exclusion and the effort needed to negotiate complex bilateral agreements. The UK also would have to contribute to the EU budget. Turkish trade (unattractive): this would be a customs union, where access to the EU internal market is allowed for goods on a tariff-free basis, but services and agriculture are excluded. We doubt the EU would be keen on including services, given the UK runs a large surplus in that area. We see this as an unattractive option.
UK-tailored deal (difficult): this would involve free trade agreements with the EU and others. Promoters of this solution point to the EU’s goods surplus with the UK as an incentive for it to grant UK financial services ‘equivalence’ (translation: have the same rights and duties as EU rivals). One problem: the UK already has trouble extracting concessions from the EU. So why would Europe yield to the UK if it were no longer contributing to the EU budget?
Conclusion: none of these options are attractive, in our view, and all would entail years of negotiations and uncertainty.
