Investorers short-termism kan destruere store værdier i børsnoterede selskaber. Forskere fra blandt andet London Business School skriver i “The short-termism trap: Catering to informed investors with limited horizons”, at kortsigtet aktivt ejerskab kan destruere store værdier: “Does the stock market exert short-term pressure on listed firms, do they respond, and is this response value reducing? We show that limited investor horizons indeed have those consequences, as follows. First, informative stock prices increase firm value; in our model, they reduce the agency cost of incentivizing managers. Second, short project maturity improves stock price informativeness by catering to informed investors with short horizons. Third, since informed trading capital is a scarce resource, attracting informed investors cannot increase an individual firm’s price informativeness in equilibrium: it simply destroys shareholder value. This ‘‘short-termism trap’’ can potentially destroy up to 100% of the benefits of stock market listing.”
Corporate governance i en tid med geoeconomics: Forsker fra Stanford Law School skriver i ”Corporate Governance in an Era of Geoeconomics”, at “in a recent paper, I explore the potential implications of geoeconomics for corporate governance of publicly listed U.S. firms. To frame the inquiry, I contrast the optimism about globalization and convergence that infused academic corporate governance debates around the turn of the twenty-first century with the darker vision of “weaponized interdependence” that fuels contemporary discussions of de-coupling. I trace the steps in one of the principal forces driving weaponized interdependence, the geopolitical chain reaction between China and the United States. The paper’s preliminary assessment of the implications of geoeconomics for U.S. corporate governance emphasizes the following: Rising perceptions of risk. Corporate perceptions of geopolitical risk are now widespread and acute. Consistent with other recent measures of risk perception, my research indicates steep increases in mentions of various forms of geopolitical risk in Forms 10-K over the past twenty years.”
Forskere fra Stanford konkluderer, at børsnoterede selskaber bedriver «Diversity Washing»: Forskerne skriver: “We provide large-sample evidence on whether U.S. publicly traded cor-porations use voluntary disclosures about their commitments to employeediversity opportunistically. We document significant discrepancies betweencompanies’ external stances on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) andtheir hiring practices. Firms that discuss DEI excessively relative to theiractual employee gender and racial diversity (“diversity washers”) obtain (..) A growing number of allegations suggest companies provide question-able portrayals of their environmental, social and governance (ESG) ac-tivities. Such misrepresentations, commonly referred to as “greenwashing”or “social washing,” are particularly concerning given the increasing num-ber of ESG-focused shareholders and stakeholders who rely on voluntaryfirm disclosures to identify ESG constructs. In the presence of these mis-representations, investors, consumers, regulators, and other stakeholdershave difficulty assessing companies’ ESG performance. Consequently, poorESG information may adversely affect ESG-oriented stakeholders’ decision-making and lead ESG-conscious investors to misallocate their capital.”
Bør bestyrelsen gentænke sine arbejdsprocesser: Amerikanske bestyrelsesrådgivere har følgende forslag til at nytænke bestyrelsesarbejdet: ”we urge boards to consider the following questions: Can the board’s “pre-read” materials be improved? Are executive summaries used to help point directors to the crux of the matters and decisions to be considered at each meeting? Consider forcing each presentation to include three to five bullets of key takeaways. Can board materials be less voluminous without sacrificing the relevancy of the information presented. If the number of board and committee meetings is increasing, can some meetings be virtual? In most circumstances, in-person board meetings are critical to effectively facilitate director engagement and discussion. However, there are some circumstances, perhaps routine committee meetings, where virtual meetings may be sufficient and more efficient. Should meeting agendas be reconfigured? If meetings tend to run over their allocated time, is too much time spent on routine matters at the outset of the meeting? Consider whether matters with more strategic importance be discussed first. Can management presentations be included in the pre-read materials rather than presented during the meeting?
Morten W. Langer
