Sådan rapporteres om risikostyring og imødegåelse af mulig økonomisk kriminalitet: Centre For Audit Quality skriver i en rapport om emnet, at det først og fremmest er vigtigt at have fokus på: “Tone at the top is an essential component of an ICFR regime. A risk-based evaluation is the best approach for achieving effectiveness and efficiency in ICFR. Internal controls over unusual and nonroutine transactions are sometimes overlooked or given less attention than core processes when developing an effective ICFR regime.” I rapporten fremhæves nogle anbefalinger: “Accounting policies must adhere to technical accounting guidance. Supervisors and managers are responsible for implementation. It is critical that these policies be understandable to non-accountants who may not be conversant in the nuances of technical accounting. Process must be married to policies. “

UK: Sådan rapporterer FTSE 100 selskaberne om Cyber risici. I rapporten “Cyber Risk Reporting I the UK” oplyses det, at ”87 procent of the FTSE 100 clearly pulled out one or more elements of cyber risk as a principal risk in their disclosures. IT systems failure was identified in the principal risks disclosure by 71 procent of the FTSE 100 and cyber crime or cyber attack was identified by a slightly higher 72 procent. Data protection risk – the risk around sensitive information, in particular compliance with data protection regulations – was identified by 59 procent while data theft or misappropriation of data, including intellectual property (IP) was specifically identified as a risk in only 33% of annual reports – although of course some companies will see this as falling under a broader risk of cyber crime. For one third of the FTSE 100 to call data theft out as a principal risk indicates just how reliant we all are on technology, and how this increases our vulnerability,” hedder det i analysen .

Langt de fleste topchefer aflønnes efter aktieafkast i forhold til Peer group selskaber: Modsat i danske børsnoterede selskaber er det langt det mest udbredte, at topchefer i udlandet bedømmes på præstationer i forhold til de nærmeste konkur – renter . Kun hvis de har klaret sig bedre end konkurrenterne ses deres præstation at være bedre end gennemsnittet. ”Companies are setting performance goals in several key areas that ultimately determine the amounts doled out to executives. By far, the most popular performance metric employed in S&P 500 incentive structures is relative total shareholder return (TSR), a measure of stock price appreciation and dividends paid to shareholders relative to a group of peer companies or market index. Nearly half the S&P 500 tied performance awards to relative TSR in 2015. Other common areas include profitability metrics, such as earnings per share (24% of S&P 500) and operating income or margin (14%), growth metrics (18% of companies utilized revenue as a metric), and other return metrics (16% tied performance awards to return on capital or invested capital). Because TSR measures an outcome that is the product of multiple inputs—many of which are outside management’s control—recipients of performance-based equity may lack the ability to pull the levers necessary to drive TSR upwards. Balancing performance awards linked to TSR performance with other metrics helps executives drive the financial, operational and strategic results needed to execute the business plan.”

“THE DEALMAKING STATE: EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION”: Hvordan virker en offentlig centraladministration, når politiske beslutninger er baseret på individuelle aftaler med enkeltvirksomheder? Det forsøger amerikanske forskere at svare på i et forskningspapir om ” The dealmaking State ”, hvori det hedder: ”In particular, the new administration has vowed to use deals with private companies to advance public policy. Even before being inaugurated, President Trump entered bargaining on a number of issues, designed to cut deals with companies to keep jobs in the United States. The last time the government pivoted towards dealmaking to realize policymaking objectives was during the financial crisis. Those deals were a form of necessary regulatory arbitrage by government, which is constrained by, among other things, notice and comment obligations, compensation requirements for takings, and principles of shareholder democracy that shield investors from public or private oppression. The financial crisis deals served as a means to evade these core values, even if they were done with attention to what the law required.”

Morten W. Langer

Se hele udgivelsen her