Resume af teksten:
Økonomer diskuterer potentialet for en aktiemarkedskorrektion, særligt i lyset af spekulationer om en AI-boble. Historisk set har amerikansk forbrug ikke lidt betydeligt under tidligere markedsnedbrud, især eftersom de rigeste, som ejer mest aktiekapital, opretholder deres forbrug. Men nu, hvor de rigeste 20% står for størstedelen af forbruget, vil selv en mindre nedgang i deres udgifter kunne påvirke økonomien. Samtidig er husholdningernes gældsbyrde lavere end i tidligere år. Dog ser finansiel stress ud til at forværres med stigende misligholdelser på billån og kreditkort. Den amerikanske centralbank har ikke samme mulighed for rentenedsættelser som i 2001 på grund af stigende oliepriser. Samtidig er AI-investeringsboomet centralt for væksten i USA, men bortset fra AI falder den private investering. Europa, der i mindre grad har deltaget i AI-capital expenditure (capex) stigningen, kan være bedre rustet til at modstå et potentielt ulykkeligt fald i markedet.
Fra ING:
We economists aren’t exactly renowned for calling stock market crashes. Collectively, we’ve probably predicted ten of the last two bear markets, which is almost as impressive as our record on recessions…
Markets may not be our patch, but the fallout from a big sell-off is. And with chatter about an AI bubble reaching fever pitch, in a week when several big tech firms have said they’re planning to raid the equity markets, it’s worth asking what happens to the economy if the whole thing starts to unravel.
The obvious comparison is the dot-com bust. And it might surprise you that back then, US consumer spending barely suffered. That’s unusual for a recession, which 2001 was.
Maybe that’s because the people who owned those stocks were wealthy enough not to slash spending when markets collapsed. Fed research suggests that if anything, this relationship has got even weaker over the past 25 years.
Today, the top 20% of US earners own 70% of the wealth. And they hold more of their assets in equities or mutual funds than real estate.
The problem is that these wealthier Americans are the only ones spending right now. The bottom 60% – who spend the same dollar amount as the top 20% – are struggling under the weight of tariffs and now pricier gasoline. If the rich pare back spending even a little bit, a key pillar of US growth falls away.
Still, this is not 2008 for one very simple reason. Deep recessions usually follow a debt binge. But that’s not obviously the case today, even if leveraged retail investors have probably helped fuel the stock market boom.
Household balance sheets look OK; debt service ratios are lower, while debt to GDP is at 70% just as it was in 2001. Back then, households were able to keep spending by raiding home equity release schemes and auto loans – until it all ended in tears in 2007 when debt had reached 100% of GDP.
That looks harder today. James Knightley, ING’s Chief International Economist in New York, points to rising delinquencies on car loans and credit cards, which suggests financial stress is already building where incomes are lower.
Then there’s the Fed. In 2001, it slashed rates by almost five percentage points. This time – in the midst of an energy shock – officials don’t have that luxury. James isn’t sold on the need to hike rates, but he thinks a rate cut is increasingly unlikely before 2027.
A lot will also depend on jobs. The latest data is looking brighter; the six-month average of private payrolls has picked up. It’s leading some Fed officials to question whether interest rates are currently less restrictive than previously thought.
But a stock market crash would undoubtedly threaten all that. What usually turns a slowdown into something nastier is widespread job loss.
Then there’s investment. AI-related spending has become a huge part of the US growth story, and the circularity is attracting more attention: the same handful of firms raising money, buying chips, leasing compute and booking revenues off one another. That may not spell disaster; my telecoms colleague Jan Frederik Slijkerman makes a compelling constructive argument for the sector.
But the fact remains that if you strip out AI, the rest of US private non-residential investment has been falling year-on-year for six straight quarters.
But that doesn’t mean it’s only tech that’s vulnerable. After dot com, capex suffered far more than consumer spending. Investment fell by 11% in the two years from late 2000 – but only 6% in IT equipment, compared to 21% for transport and a whopping 55% for manufacturing buildings.
Tech might be the source of a stock market correction. But tighter financial conditions, wider credit spreads and lender caution would bite across the board – particularly with the Fed’s hands somewhat tied by rising oil prices. Private credit is an obvious weak spot.
As for AI itself, an overvalued stock market doesn’t mean the technology itself is useless – though it might lead to a more realistic assessment of its uses. Railways had a bubble. So did the internet. Both still changed the world. But if money gets tighter and labour gets (comparatively) cheaper in a weaker jobs market, firms won’t be that keen to spend heavily on expensive compute.
This is a good point to bring in Europe, which for once might be grateful for missing out on the boom. We’re not immune to a crash. But we don’t have the same wealth-driven consumer story; equities make up 13% of British households’ financial assets to America’s 44%.
Nor do we have the same AI capex surge. Imports of computer equipment and semiconductors – a rough proxy of investment – have risen 38% in the UK since 2019 versus 258% in the US.
That may look rather helpful if the house of cards starts to fall apart. And don’t forget, if AI really is a game-changer, Europe still benefits from all the extra productivity. The investment might be in the US, but the benefits will be felt everywhere.
Anyway, that was a nice excuse not to talk about oil prices yet again – but it’s business as usual on Monday as I join Carsten Brzeski, James Knightley, Chris Turner and Rebecca Byrne for a live webinar, looking ahead to this month’s central bank meetings. Get yourself signed up here .
James Smith
United States (James Knightley)
CPI (Wed): Consumer price inflation is set to breach 4% as higher fuel and freight charges contribute to an elevated CPI print of 0.5% MoM / 4.2% YoY. Core inflation is likely to be more subdued at 0.3% MoM, but that would still push the annual rate of inflation up to 2.9% from 2.8%. Producer price inflation is also likely to remain elevated for similar reasons. This will ensure the Federal Reserve adopts an increasingly hawkish stance at the June 17 FOMC meeting, even though it is perceived as dovish, with Kevin Warsh’s first meeting as Chair. New forecasts are likely to result in the one rate cut Fed officials had signalled as their central projection in March being removed from the forecast profile. We enter the Fed’s quiet period on Saturday, meaning no policy-related comments from officials next week.
Eurozone (Carsten Brzeski)
Rate decision (Thu): With a rate hike looking like a done deal, all focus will be on whether the ECB gives any guidance on what will happen beyond next week’s meeting. We don’t expect any significant changes to the ECB’s new macro projections but see them close to their March levels. If anything, the inflation forecast for this year could be revised somewhat higher; growth could be revised marginally lower. In general, we expect the ECB to strike a delicate balance between not calling the hike a ‘one-and-done’ hike while also stopping short of pre-announcing further hikes. Read our full preview
Canada (James Knightley)
Rate Decision (Wed): The Bank of Canada leaned dovishly at the April policy meeting and is likely to continue signalling no imminent prospect of a rate hike. Since April, inflation has come in below expectations, the economy has lost jobs and has entered a “technical recession”. The market is still pricing one 25bp interest rate hike this year, but we don’t expect anything before Q2 2027.
Hungary (Peter Virovacz)
Inflation (Tue): Following the dovish‑toned May rate‑setting meeting in Hungary, we highlighted two important pieces of data ahead of the June decision. In our view, the April PPI was muted and so the May inflation print will be as well. The strength of the forint helps to offset the impact of import price increases caused by the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, the May inflation data will now fully reflect the impact of the fuel price cap, meaning the fuel component will not contribute to inflationary pressure. While global food prices are trending upwards, price shield measures are also in place in Hungary. Even if the impact of the forint were not enough to limit durable goods prices, we think that the usual pre‑World Cup sales will have an impact here as well. Overall, we anticipate a moderate 0.2% and 0.1% month‑on‑month increase in the headline and core readings, respectively. This would mean that year‑on‑year figures would be significantly lower than the central bank’s latest official projection made in March. Therefore, after next week’s data release, we believe there is an open‑and‑shut case for a rate cut in June. The question now is how big the cut should be: 25bp or 50bp?
Czech Republic (David Havrlant)
Industrial Output (Mon): Industrial output likely maintained positive annual growth in April, while higher input costs and uncertainty induced by the Hormuz conflict are set to pressure demand and production with a considerable lag. The trade surplus likely became less pronounced in April, while the current account balance remained broadly stable with a slight surplus in the same month. The inflation breakdown is set to show softer core inflation and increasing food prices. Continued layoffs in industry due to efficiency pressures will prevent the unemployment rate from easing in May.
Turkey (Muhammet Mercan)
Rate Decision (Thu): Turkey’s Central Bank Governor Karahan recently stated that the current policy stance, marked by a tighter monetary approach maintained for longer than initially anticipated prior to recent geopolitical developments, remains appropriate. He also underlined that all policy options continue to be available. This approach signals a clear intention to preserve flexibility in policymaking amid evolving geopolitical conditions. Against this backdrop, and considering the recent macroprudential tightening through reduced lending growth caps, along with contained retail foreign exchange demand, we expect the central bank to leave interest rates unchanged at the June MPC meeting. However, ongoing geopolitical uncertainties, as well as domestic political dynamics, may prompt a more cautious stance, potentially resulting in an upward adjustment of the policy rate from 37% towards the current effective funding rate of around 40%.
Hurtige nyheder er stadig i beta-fasen, og fejl kan derfor forekomme.
