Forslag til nye svenske anbefalinger om selskabsledelse: Dropper generalforsamlingsbeslutning om ansvarsfrihed til bestyrelsen, og der skal afholdes fysiske generalforsamlinger: I forslag til reviderede anbefalinger hedder det, at ”Det finns i det svenska samhället en positiv syn på att större aktieägare tar ett särskilt ansvar för bolagen genom att från styrelsepositioner aktivt delta i förvaltningen av bolagen. Samtidigt får en stark ägarmakt inte missbrukas till skada för bolaget eller övriga aktieägare. Aktiebolagslagen innehåller därför flera regler till skydd för minoritetsaktieägare med bland annat krav på kvalificerad majoritet för en rad bolagsstämmobeslut. För att det starka minoritetsskyddet i svenska aktiebolag ska kunna upprätthållas får det emellertid inte missbrukas. Ett exempel på sådant missbruk är att neka ansvarsfrihet för styrelseledamöter på annan grund än hur styrelseledamoten i fråga har skött sitt styrelseuppdrag, till exempel med hänvisning till röstvärdesskillnader i bolagets bolagsordning.” Og videre om fysiske generalforsamlinger: ”Vidare har den kommande lagstiftningen om digitala bolagsstämmor föranlett förslag till en ny kodregel om att börsbolag alltid ska hålla fysiska stämmor, oavsett om digitalt deltagande erbjuds eller inte, då det fysiska mötet mellan bolagsledning och aktieägare anses utgöra en viktig del av den framg-ångsrika svenska bolagsstyrningsmodellen. Utöver detta har följderna av de internationella röstningsrådgivarnas rekommendationer gett avtryck i ändringsförslagen.”
UK mistede 20 mia. kr. i skatteindtægter fra Big Tech-firmaer, der flyttede deres skatteindtægter andre steder hen. The Guardian skriver, at ”the UK might have missed out on as much as £2bn in tax in 2021 from big tech companies shifting their profits elsewhere, according to an estimate by a group campaigning for greater tax transparency. Seven of the biggest US-headquartered tech companies, including Apple, Microsoft and Google owner Alphabet , are estimated to have paid £750m in UK corporation tax and the digital sales tax, compared with £2.8bn in estimated tax due had profits not been routed elsewhere, according to TaxWatch, a campaign group. Big multinational companies often have complicated structures using different subsidiaries around the world. In many cases that makes it near impossible for observers to calculate how much tax they have paid in the UK, and whether the amounts paid align with the amount of activity in the UK.” Ifølge Skat herhjemme betalte Google dansk skat på 8,1 mio. kr. i 2021.
Californien har vedtaget skrappe oplysningskrav for klima: ”Under a pair of California laws signed by Governor Newsom on October 7, 2023, many large U.S. companies will be required to make broad-based climate-related disclosures starting as early as 2026. These laws will have a profound impact on companies doing business in California, with certain disclosure requirements going beyond the requirements of the SEC’s proposed climate-related disclosure rule or the current practices of most public companies. California passed two climate-related disclosure bills: S.B. 253, the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act, which will require certain companies to disclose their direct (scope 1), indirect (scope 2) and value chain (scope 3) greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and S.B. 261, the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act, which will require certain companies to disclose climate-related financial risks pursuant to the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations.”
Hvad sker der med selskabets performance, når CEO’en dør? Forskere har undersøgt, hvad der sker med børsnoterede selskabers børsværdi, performance og adfærd efter deres CEO går bort, altså dør. I forskningspapiret hedder det. At “our paper “ Good and Bad CEOs ” analyzes changes in firm value, performance, and behavior caused by deaths of incumbent CEOs. This allows us to measure the contribution of the deceased CEO relative to that of their successor. Unlike other CEO turnovers, most CEO deaths are randomly allocated to firms and are not a decision made by the board of directors. Hence, any effects of CEO deaths on firms should be due to scarce CEO talent, changes in the division of value between shareholders and CEOs, or frictions in the matching of CEOs to firms. Analyzing 449 CEO deaths in publicly traded US firms between 1980 and 2012, we find striking heterogeneity in the shareholder value effects of CEO deaths. While the average stock price reaction to CEO deaths is small, we document large negative reactions to many deaths and large positive ones to many others. In 10% of cases, stock prices drop by at least 13% in the four days around announcements, while in another 10% of cases, stock prices rise by at least 11%.”
Morten W. Langer
